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Some Preliminary Comments
The output of European governance is like that of a state, even a super state: An
endless stream of laws in increasingly varied areas of public and private life. They
are binding on governments and individuals as part of the law of land. Indeed they
are a higher law of the land -- supreme over conflicting State laws. The structure
and process of European governance, by contrast, is not at all, in many of its
features, like that of a state. In particular it lacks many of the features we associate
with democratic government.
In this essay we try to make a contribution to the Post-Maastricht  discussion about
democracy in,  and democratization of, the European Union.
The essay is non-linear:  There is no central thesis which is developed and carried
through the paper. Instead we will first present a  "Standard Version" of the critique
of democracy in the Union. The Standard Version is non-attributable. It is an
aggregate of public opinion data, politicians' statements, media commentary, and
considerable learned analysis. It is an uneasy attempt to capture the core of the
present discussion on European democracy. Our attempt is earnest: We share much
of the critique in the Standard Version and take responsibility for its shortcomings.
Our purpose thus is not to set up a  caricature, an Aunt Sally or straw man which we
shall later debunk. The remaining four uneasy pieces are meant instead to explore
unstated or unexplored premises of the Standard Version and to widen the range of
issues which we believe should be part of the discussion. Despite the overall length
of this essay, each part will, inevitably be sketchy, work-in-progress, an agenda for
further reflection.
Following the Standard Version  we shall address the following:
I. Who is the Demos? We will first attend to the uneasy issue of Demos.
Much democratic theory presupposes a polity (usually a State) and almost all
theories presuppose a demos. Democracy, in a loose sense, is about the many
permutations of exercise of power by and for that  demos. Indeed, the existence of a
demos is, we think, not merely a semantic condition for democracy. In the case of
Europe we can not presuppose demos. After all, an article of faith of European
integration has been the aim of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.
Demoi, then, rather than demos. Can there be democratization at the European level
absent a transcendent notion of a European people? Is there a European demos
around which, by which, for which a democracy can be established? How should or
could it be defined? How could or should it fit into political theory? These are some
of the questions we shall address.
II. What is the Polity? Although in a formal sense we can speak of the Union
as a single polity, from the perspective of governance and power -- its exercise,
control and accountability --  the notion of a European polity  is no less uneasy than
the notion of European peoplehood. We will present a description of European
governance which has (at least) three principal  facets: International, Supranational
and Infranational. Our argument is simple. In this sense there are three polities, or
three regimes, or three modes of governance.  This trichotomy creates
fundamentally different permutations of power distribution in the overall European
polity. The problems of democracy manifest themselves in different ways which
need to be explored.
III. Which Democracy? An interesting feature of the democratization
discussion in Europe, especially the blueprints for change,  concerns the very
understanding of democracy. Very rarely, if at all,  is there more than cursory 
acknowledgment of the uneasy co-existence of competing visions and models of
democracy which, in turn, should inform both diagnosis, prognosis and possible
remedy of democratic shortcomings. Typically and endearingly there is an implicit
projection onto Europe of a national self-understanding of democratic governance.
The task is rendered more complex by the need to juggle models of democracy with
the Unions permutations of governance. We shall offer some pointers in that
direction.
IV. Democracy over  What? The final piece addresses an issue which is not
merely uneasy, it is notorious. What should be the limits of the Union's jurisdiction?
Is there anything one can add to the issue of "subsidiarity", competences and
jurisdiction? Apart from making the banal point that this issue too belongs to the
core of the democracy discussion, we shall explore jurisdictional lines as part of
governance process and institutional structure rather than addressing the substantive
problem of allocating material competences.
In broadening the discussion in the ways we propose, the result  we have in mind is,
evidently,  a Revised Version, not a revisionist version of the democracy debate.
I.  The Critique of Democracy in Europe: "The Standard Version"
The democratic problems of European integration are well explored.  The
phenomenon is frequently labelled as the  "Democratic Deficit" of the Community
but whatever nomenclature is employed, the principal features are notorious. Here is
a capsule version.
European Integration has seen many, and increasingly important, government
functions transferred to "Brussels", brought within the exclusive or concurrent
responsibility of the Community and Union. This is problematic in a variety
of ways.
Though the formal political boundaries of the State have remained intact, in
the areas of transfer of responsibility to the Union the functional political
boundaries of the polity have been effectively re-drawn.  If critical public
policy choices about, say,  international trade, or environmental protection, or
consumer protection, or immigration  come exclusively or predominantly
within Community responsibility, for those matters the locus of decision-
making  is no longer the State but the Union. Even if the Union were to
replicate in its system of governance the very same institutional set-up found
in its constituent states, there would be a diminution in  the specific gravity, in
 the political weight, in the level of control  of each individual within the
redrawn political boundaries. That is, arguendo, an inevitable result from
enlarging the membership of the functional polity (when a company issues
new voting shares, the value of each share is reduced)  and from adding a tier
of government thereby distancing it further from its ultimate subjects in whose
name and for whom democratic government is supposed to operate.  If you
want a label, call this Inverted Regionalism. All the real and supposed virtues
of regionalism are here inverted.
Inverted Regionalism does not simply diminish democracy in the sense of
individual disempowerment, it also fuels the separate and distinct
phenomenon of de-legitimation. Democracy and legitimacy are not co-
terminus. One knows from the past  of polities with arguably democratic
structure and process which enjoyed  shaky political legitimacy and were
replaced, democratically, with dictatorships.  One knows from the past and
present of polities with egregiously undemocratic governmental  structure and
process which, nonetheless, enjoyed or enjoy high levels of legitimacy. 
Inverted Regionalism, to the extent, that it diminishes democracy in the sense
outlined above or to the extent that it is thought to have that effect, will, to a
greater or lesser extent, undermine the legitimacy of the Union.
The perceived perniciousness of Inverted Regionalism and its delegitimation effect
will be/are enhanced by three factors:
The reach of the Community or Union  into areas which are, or are
thought to be, classical symbolic "State" functions in relation to which
"Foreigners" should not be telling "Us" (French, or Danes, or Irish etc.)
how to run our lives. These areas, socially constructed and culturally
bound, are not fixed. They range from the ridiculous (the British Pint)
to the sublime (the right-to-life of the Irish abortion saga).  
The reach of the Community or Union into areas which are, or are
thought to be, matters left to individuals or  local communities and in
relation to which "Government" should not be telling "Us" (the people)
how to run their lives.
The perception, whether or not rooted in reality, that there is no
effective limit and/or check on the ability of the Community or Union
to reach into areas previously thought to be the preserve of the state or
of the individual.
Inverted Regionalism is only one feature of the alleged democratic malaise of
European Integration. We wrote above: "Even if the Union were to replicate
in its system of governance the very same institutional set-up found in its
constituent states, there would be a diminution in  the specific gravity, in  the
political weight, in the level of control  of each individual within the redrawn
political boundaries." But, of course, the Union does not replicate domestic
democratic arrangements.
A feature of the democratic process within the Member States, with many
variations of course,  is that  government, the executive branch, is, at least
formally, subject to parliamentary accountability. In particular, when policy
requires legislation, parliamentary approval is needed.  National parliaments,
apart from exercising  these "power functions," also fulfil a "public forum"
function described variously as information, communication, legitimation etc.
The argument is that Community and Union governance and Community
institutions have a perverse effect on these principal democratic processes
within the Member States and within the Union itself.
Community and Union governance pervert the balance between executive and
legislative organs of government  of the State. The Member State executive
branch, Government Ministers, are reconstituted in the Community as the
principal legislative organ with, as noted above, an ever widening jurisdiction
 over increasing areas of public policy. The volume, complexity and timing of
the Community decisional process makes national parliamentary control,
especially in large Member States, more an illusion than a reality. In a
majority decision environment, the power of national parliaments to affect
outcomes in the Council of Ministers is further reduced.  The European
Parliament does not offer an effective substitution. Even after Maastricht the
powers of the European Parliament in the legislative process leave formal and
formidable gaps in parliamentary control.  On this reading, Union governance
results in a net empowerment of the executive branch of the States.  
The European Parliament is debilitated not only by its formal absence of
certain powers but also by its structural remoteness. The technical ability of
MEPs to link and represent actual constituents  to the Community process is
seriously compromised in the larger Member States by simple reasons of size.
Its abstract representation function of "the people" -- its public forum function
-- is also compromised, by a combination of its ineffective powers (the real
decisions do not happen there), by its mode of operation (time and place), by
its language "problem", by the difficulty (and disinterest) of media coverage.
It is evocative that over the years one has seen a gradual increase in the
formal powers of the European Parliament and a decrease in the turn-out to
European elections. And when they turn out, these elections are dominated by
a national political agenda, a mid-term signal to the national party in power.
This is, an evocative fact too, the opposite of American politics where State
elections are  frequently a mid-term signal to the central federal government.
The non-emergence of true trans-European political parties is another
expression of the phenomenon. Critically,  there is no real sense in which the
European political process allows the electorate "to throw the scoundrels
out", to take what is often the only ultimate power left to the people which is
to replace one set of "governors" by another. In its present state, no one who
votes in the European elections has a strong sense at all of affecting critical
policy choices at the European level and certainly not of confirming or
rejecting European governance.
Community governance might have a distorting effect also if one takes a neo-
corporatist view of the European polity. Under this view, government -- both
executive and legislative branches -- do not monopolize policy-making and
are but actors, important actors, in a broader arena involving public and
private parties. The importance of parliament under this model is to give
voice and power to diffuse and fragmented interests whose principal political
clout derives from a combination of their electoral power and the re-election
drive of politicians. Other actors, such as, say, big industry or organized
labour, whose "membership" is far less diffuse and fragmented, exercise
influence through different channels and by different means such as  political
contributions, control of party organization, and direct lobbying of the
administration. When policy areas are transferred to Europe there will be a
per-se weakening effect on diffuse and fragmented national interests deriving
from the greater difficulty they will experience in organizing themselves at the
transnational level compared to, say, a more compact body of large
manufacturers (e.g. the tobacco industry). In addition, the structural weakness
of the European Parliament has a corresponding effect on these interests even
if organized. Electoral power simply carries less weight in Euro-politics.
Since the outcome of the Community legislative process becomes  the
supreme law of the land, national judicial control of primary legislation -- in
those systems which have such control (e.g. Italy, Germany, Ireland) -- is
compromised, too. The European Court of Justice, like the European
Parliament,  does not, arguendo, offer an effective substitution since,
inevitably it is informed by different judicial sensibilities in particular in
relation to interpreting the limits of Community competences. Since the
governments of the Member States are not only the most decisive legislative
organ of the Community, but also fulfil the most important executive function
(they, much more than the Commission, are responsible for the
implementation and execution  of Community law and policy) they escape,
too, national parliamentary (typically weak) and national judicial (typically
stronger) control of large chunks of their administrative functions.
Domestic preferences are, arguably, perverted in a substantive sense, too. A
Member State may elect a center right government and yet might be subject
to center left policies if a majority of, say, center left governments dominate
the Council. Conversely, there might even be a majority of, say, center right
governments in the Council, but they might find themselves thwarted by a
minority of center right governments or even by a single such government
where Community decisional rules provide for unanimity. Both in Council
and in the European Parliament the principle of proportional representation is
compromised whereby enhanced voice is accorded citizens of small states,
notably  Luxembourg, and, arguably, inadequate voice accorded citizens of
the larger states, notably Germany. 
Lastly a feature which is said to pervade all Community governance, and
negatively affect the democratic process, is its overall lack of transparency.
This is not just a result of the added layer of governance and its increased
remoteness. The process itself is notoriously prolix, extremely divergent when
one moves from one policy area to another and in part kept secret.
"Comitology" is an apt neologism -- a phenomenon which requires its very
own science which no single person has mastered.
This concludes the Standard Version. Our argument is that it represents some kind
of "Received Knowledge" though we have tried to be careful in my claims about its
veracity. It is true if it corresponds to some objective reality; it is real, albeit in a
different way, if it is believed  to be true. Probably no one subscribes to all of its
tenets. We will not critique it directly but instead turn to certain features which have
been absent from the debate or have been underplayed in the Standard Version.
II. Democracy without a Demos?
Here is one way of introducing this issue. For decades lawyers have been speaking
loosely about the "constitutionalization" of the Treaties establishing the European
Community and Union. In part this has meant the emergence of European law as
constitutionally "higher law"  with immediate effect within the "legal space" of the
Community. Thankfully, the political science of European integration, which had
lagged somewhat in noticing the phenomenon and understanding its importance, has
in recent times been addressing it. But so far most searching, and illuminating,
analysis has been on constitutionalization as an element in understanding
governance with most attention given to the newly discovered actors (e.g. the
European Court and national courts), to the myriad factors which explain the
emergence and acceptance of the new constitutional architecture, to the constraints,
real or imaginary,  which constitutionalism places on political and economic actors
and to the dynamics of interaction between the various actors and between legal
integration and other forms of integration. In very large measure all these
phenomena have been discussed in positivist terms, positivism  as understood both
in political science and law.
There is an underlying issue which, to date, has received, to the best of our
knowledge, less attention: By what authority, if any  -- understood in the vocabulary
of normative political theory -- can the claim of European law to be both
constitutionally superior and with immediate effect in the polity be sustained. Why
should the subjects of European law  in the Union, individuals, courts, governments
et cetera feel bound to observe the law of the Union as higher law, in the same way
that their counterparts in, say, the USA are bound, to and by, American federal law?
It is a dramatic question since constitutionalization has formally taken place and to
give a negative answer would be very subversive. This is partly why the critique of
European democracy is often conflicted. One can, it seems, proclaim a profound
democracy deficit and yet insist at the same time on the importance of accepting the
supremacy of Union law.
One of the most trenchant critiques of authority to emerge recently has come from a
certain strand of German constitutional theory and can be entitled the No-Demos
thesis. Interestingly, it found powerful expression in the so-called Maastricht
decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court.  The decision, formally
unanimous,  contains conflicting strands. We shall present the robust version culled
from decision and constitutional writing.  We should add that this is but a German
version of deep strand in both the political self-understanding and the theory of the
European Nation-State.
The No Demos Thesis
The following is a composite version of the No Demos thesis culled from the
decision of the Court itself and some of the principal exponents of this thesis.
The people of a polity, the Volk, its demos, is a concept which has a
subjective -- socio-psychological -- component which is rooted in objective,
organic conditions. Both the subjective and objective can be observed
empirically in a way which would enable us, on the basis of observation and
analysis, to determine that, for example, there is no European Volk.
The subjective manifestations of peoplehood, of the demos, are to be found in
a sense of social cohesion, shared  destiny and collective self-identity which,
in turn, result in (and deserve) loyalty. These subjective manifestations have
thus both a descriptive and also a normative element. 
The subjective manifestations are a result of, but are also conditioned on,
some, though not necessarily all, of the following objective elements:
Common language, common history, common cultural habits and sensibilities
and -- this is dealt with more discretely since the twelve years of National-
Socialism -- common ethnic origin, common religion. All these factors do not
alone capture the essence of Volk -- one will always find allusions to some
spiritual, even mystic, element as well. Whereas different writers may throw a
different mix of elements into the pot, an insistence on a relatively high
degree of homogeneity, measured by these ethno-cultural criteria, is typically
an important, indeed critical element of the discourse. Here rests, of course,
the most delicate aspect of the theory since the insistence on homogeneity is
what conditions in its statal operationalization the rules for inclusion and
exclusion. When, say, Jews were excluded from full membership in many
European nation-states as equal citizens it was often on the theory that being
a Christian was essential to the homogeneity of the people.
The "organic" nature of the Volk is a delicate matter. We call "organic" those
parts of the discourse which make, to a greater or lesser degree, one or more
of the following claims: The Volk pre-dates historically, and precedes
politically the modern State. Germany could emerge as a modern Nation-
State because there was already a German Volk. The "nation" is simply a
modern appellation, in the context of modernist political theory and
international law, of the pre-existing Volk and the state is its political
expression. It is on this view that the compelling case for German
(re)unification rested. One could split the German State but not the German
nation. Hence, maybe  unification of the State but certainly only reunification
of the people. Anthropologically, this understanding of, say, being German,
which means being part of the German Volk, is  "organic" in the following
sense: It has, first, an almost natural connotation. You are born German the
way you are born male or female -- though you can, with only somewhat
greater ease, change your national identity (even then you will remain an "ex-
German") and to the extent that ethnicity continues to play a role -- muted to
be sure -- in this discourse of the Volk, ethnicity is even more immutable than
gender -- there is no operation which can change one's ethnicity. The
implication of this is that one's nationality as a form of identity is almost
primordial according to this view, taking precedence over other forms of
consciousness and membership. I may have solidarity with fellow Christians
elsewhere, fellow workers elsewhere, fellow women elsewhere. This would
make me a Christian German, a Socialist German, a feminist German or, at
most, a German Christian, a German Socialist, a German feminist. I cannot
escape my Volkish, national identity.
No one today argues that the  "organic" is absolute. One can, after all,
"naturalize", acquire membership in a new nation -- but even here, doesn't the
word "naturalization" speak volumes? And one can, more as an hypothesis
than a reality, imagine that should the objective conditions sufficiently
change, and a measure of homogeneity in language, culture, shared historical
experience develop, a subjective consciousness could follow and a new
Volk/nation emerge. But, realistically, these mutations are possible in a
"geological" time frame -- epochal, not generational.
Volk fits into modern political theory easily enough. The German
Constitution may have constituted the post-War German state, but it did not
constitute the German people except, perhaps, in some narrow legal sense.
The Volk, the Nation, understood in this national, ethno-cultural sense are the
basis for the modern State. They are the basis in an older, self-determination
sense of political independence in statehood. Only nations "may have" states.
The State belongs to the nation -- its Volk, and the Nation (the Volk)
"belong" to the State.
Critically, Volk/nation  are also the basis for the modern democratic State:
The nation and its members, the Volk, constitute the polity for the purposes
of accepting the discipline of democratic, majoritarian governance. Both
descriptively and prescriptively (how it is and how it ought to be) a minority
will/should accept the legitimacy of a majority decision because both majority
and minority are part of the same Volk, belong to the nation. That is an
integral part of what rule-by-the-people, democracy, means on this reading.
Thus, nationality constitutes the state (hence nation-state) which in turn
constitutes its political boundary, an idea which runs from Schmitt to
Kirchhof.  The significance of the political boundary is not only to the older
notion of political independence and territorial integrity, but also to the very
democratic nature of the polity. A parliament is, on this view, an institution of
democracy not only because it provides a mechanism for representation and
majority voting, but because it represents the Volk, the nation, the demos
from which derive the authority and legitimacy of its decisions. To drive this
point home, imagine an anschluss between Germany and Denmark. Try and
tell the Danes that they should not worry since they will have full
representation in the Bundestag. Their screams of grief will be shrill not
simply because they will be condemned, as Danes, to permanent minorityship
(that may be true for the German Greens too), but because the way
nationality, in this way of thinking, enmeshes with democracy is that even
majority rule is only legitimate within a demos, when Danes rule Danes.
Demos, thus, is a condition of democracy. By contrast, when democrats like
Alfred Verdross argued for a Greater Germany this was clearly not motivated
by some proto-fascist design but by a belief that the German speaking
"peoples" were in fact one people in terms of this very understanding of
peoplehood.
Turning to Europe, it is argued as a matter of empirical observation, based on
these ethno-cultural criteria, that there is no European demos -- not a people
not a nation. Neither the subjective element (the sense of shared collective
identity and loyalty) nor the objective conditions which could produce these
(the kind of homogeneity of the ethno-national conditions on which
peoplehood depend) exist. Long term peaceful relations with thickening
economic and social intercourse should not be confused with the bonds of
peoplehood and nationality forged by language, history, ethnicity  and all the
rest. At this point we detect two versions to the No Demos thesis. The "soft"
version of the Court itself is the Not Yet version: Although there is no demos
now the possibility for the future is not precluded a-priori. If and when a
European demos emerges, then, and only then, will the basic political
premises of the decision have to be reviewed. This is unlikely in the
foreseeable future. The "hard" version does not only dismiss that possibility
as objectively unrealistic but also as undesirable: It is argued (correctly in my
view) that integration is not about creating a European nation or people, but
about the ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe. However, what the
"soft" and "hard" version share is the same understanding of peoplehood, its
characteristics and manifestations.
Soft version or hard, the consequences of the No Demos thesis for the
European construct are interesting. The rigorous implication of this view 
would be that absent a demos, there cannot, by definition, be a democracy or
democratization at the European level. This is not a semantic proposition. On
this reading, European democracy (meaning a minimum binding majoritarian
decision-making at the European level) without a demos is no different from
the previously mentioned German-Danish anschluss except on a larger scale.
Giving the Danes a vote in the Bundestag is, as argued, ice cold comfort.
Giving them a vote in the European Parliament or Council is, conceptually, no
different. This would be true for each and every nation-state. European
integration, on this view, may have involved a certain transfer of state
functions to the Union but this has not been accompanied by a redrawing of
political boundaries which can occur only if, and can be ascertained only
when, a European Volk can be said to exist. Since this, it is claimed, has not
occurred, the Union and its institutions can have neither the authority nor the
legitimacy of a Demos-cratic State. Empowering the European Parliament is
no solution and could -- to the extent that it weakens the Council (the voice of
the Member States) -- actually exacerbate the legitimacy problem of the
Community. On this view, a parliament without a demos is conceptually
impossible, practically despotic. If the European Parliament is not the
representative of a people, if the territorial boundaries of the EU do not
correspond to its political boundaries, than the writ of such a parliament has
only slightly more legitimacy than the writ of an emperor.
What, however, if the interests of the nation-state would be served by
functional cooperation with other nation-states? The No Demos thesis has an
implicit and traditional solution: Cooperation through international treaties,
freely entered into by High Contracting Parties, preferably of a contractual
nature (meaning no-open ended commitments) capable of denunciation,
covering well-circumscribed subjects. Historically, such treaties were
concluded by heads of state embodying the sovereignty of the nation-state.
Under the more modern version, such treaties are concluded by a government
answerable to a national parliament often requiring parliamentary approval
and subject to the material conditions of the national democratic constitution.
Democracy is safeguarded in that way.
Democracy and Membership
There is much that is puzzling in the reasoning of the German Court. For example:
If the concern of the German Court was to safeguard the democratic character of the
European construct in its future developments, and if its explicit and implicit thesis
that absence a European demos, democracy can be guaranteed only through
Member State mechanisms, it is hard to see how, employing the same sensibilities it
could have given a democratic seal of approval to the already existing European
Community and Union. Whatever the original intentions of the High Contracting
parties, the Treaties establishing the European Community and Union have become
like no other international parallel, and national procedures to ensure democratic
control over international treaties of the State are clearly ill suited and woefully
inadequate to address the problems posited by the European Union.
One could suggest, explicitly or implicitly, that the current situation of the Union has
been democratically legitimated by national processes -- for example the successive
approvals of the Community by the houses of the German parliament. But this is
problematic and somewhat embarrassing, too. First, even if the current Union has
been democratically approved by successive approvals of Treaty amendments (such
as the Single European Act and the various acts of accession of new Member
States) this takes a very formal view of democratic legitimation. Is it not just a little
bit like the Weimar elections which democratically approved a non-democratic
regime? Is it not the task of a constitutional court to be a counter-balance to such
self-defeating democratization? Member State mediation does have a powerful
impact on the social and formal legitimacy of the European construct but it has done
only little to address the problems of deficient democratic structures and processes.
If the current democratic malaise of the Union can be said to have been cured by the
simple fact that national parliaments have endorsed the package deal in one way or
another, the Court would have engaged at worst in another form of fiction about the
reality of the Union and the democratizing power of national structures and
institutions, at best in adopting a formal and impoverished sense of what it takes to
ensure democracy in the polity.
The Court could have adopted an alternative construct: Highlight, embarrassing as
this may have been, the democratic failings of the Community, uncured by
Maastricht and in which all European and Member State institutions (including
courts)  connived. Since, despite these failings, the Union was formally legitimated
the Court could have, for example, approved the Treaty but insisted that the existing
gap between formal legitimation and material democratic deficiency must be
regarded as temporary and could not be accepted in the medium and long term. In
this way the Bundesverfassungsgericht would have thrown its formidable power
behind the pressure for democratization. For all its talk about democracy, the Court,
by adopting the view it has on Volk, Staat and Staatsangehörigkeit has boxed itself
into a further untenable situation. Stated briefly: If the judges who subscribed to the
decision truly believe that a polity enjoying democratic authority and legitimate rule-
making power must be based on the conflation of Volk, Staat and
Staatsangehörigkeit, that the only way to conceive of the demos of such a polity is
in thickly homogeneous ethno-cultural terms, then, whether one admits it or not, the
future of European integration poses a huge threat. The problem is not that there is
not now a European demos; the problem is that there might one day be one. And
why is that a problem? Because the emergence of a European demos in a European
polity enjoying legitimate democratic authority would signify -- on this
understanding of polity and demos --  the replacement of the various Member State
demoi, including the German Volk. This, we would agree, would be a price too high
to pay for European integration. But since on their reading there is only a binary
option -- either a European State (one European Volk) or a Union of States (with the
preservation of all European Völker -- including Germans) their fear is inevitable.
We  shall try and show how this view is based on one and perhaps two  profound
misconceptions with unfortunate consequences both for Germany itself and for
Europe.  Our challenge, note, is not to the ethno-cultural, homogeneous concept of
Volk as such. It is, instead, to the view which insists that the only way to think of a
demos, bestowing legitimate rule-making and democratic authority on a polity, is in
these Volkish terms. We also challenge the concomitant notion that the only way to
think of a polity, enjoying legitimate rule-making and democratic authority, is in
statal terms. Finally, we challenge the implicit view in the decision that the only way
to imagine the Union is in some statal form: Staat, Staatenbund, Bundesstaat,
Staatenverbund. Noteworthy is not only the "enslavement" to the notion of State, but
also, as we shall see, the inability to contemplate an entity with a simultaneous
multiple identity. Polycentric thinking is, apparently, unacceptable.
We shall  construct the critique step-by-step beginning with Demos-as-Volk first. 
We want to raise three possible objections to the Court's version of the No Demos
thesis and its implications.
The first objection has two strands. One, less compelling, would argue that the No
Demos  thesis simply misreads the European anthropological map. That, in fact,
there is a European sense of social cohesion, shared identity and collective self
which, in turn, results in (and deserves) loyalty and which bestows thus potential
authority and democratic legitimacy on European institutions. In short that there is,
want it or not, a European people on the terms stipulated by the No Demos thesis
and that the only problem of democracy in the Community relates to the deficient
processes, such as the weakness of the European Parliament, but not the deep
structural absence of a demos.  Though there is no common European language, that
cannot in itself be a conditio sine qua non as the case of, say, Switzerland would
illustrate. And there is a sufficient measures of shared history and cultural habits to
sustain this construct. The problem is that this construct simply  does not ring true.
For most Europeans any sense of European identity defined in ethno-cultural or
ethno-national terms would be extremely weak. We do not wish to pursue this
critique as such.
But there is one strand worth picking up from this first objection. One can argue 
that peoplehood and national identity have, at certain critical moments of transition,
a far larger degree of artificiality, of social constructionism and even social
engineering than the organic, Volkish view would concede. As such they are far
more fluid, potentially unstable and capable of change. They decidedly can be
constructed as a conscious decision and not only be a reflection of an already pre-
existing consciousness. Indeed, how could one ever imagine political unification
taking place if it has strictly to follow the sense of peoplehood? In the creation of
European states involving political unification such as, yes,  Germany and Italy, the
act of formal unification preceded full and universal shift of consciousness.
Although conceptually the nation is the condition for the state, historically, it has
often been the state which constituted the nation by imposing a language and/or
prioritizing a dialect and/or privileging a certain historical narrative and/or creating
symbols and myths. This would, often, have to be the order in the process of
unification. Think, say, of Prussia and Austria. Is it so fanciful to imagine a different
historical path in which Prussia went its own way, privileging a particularized read
of its history, symbols, cultural habits and myths and developing a sense of Volk
and  nation which would emphasize that which separates it from other German-
speaking nations and that Austria, in this would-be history, could have just become
another part of a unified Germany?
We are, of course, taking no position here on the desirability or otherwise of
European unification driven by the notion of nation and peoplehood. (As will
transpire, we oppose it.)  But we are arguing that to insist on the emergence of a
pre-existing European Demos defined in ethno-cultural terms as a precondition for
constitutional unification or, more minimally, a re-drawing of political boundaries, is
to ensure that this will never happen. The No Demos thesis which is presented by its
advocates as rooted in empirical and objective observation barely conceals a pre-
determined outcome.
The second objection is more central and is concerned with the notion of 
membership implicit in the No Demos thesis. Who, we may ask, are the members
of, say,  the German polity? The answer would seem obvious: The German Volk,
those who have German nationality. They are Germany's demos. Germany is the
state of the Germans defined in the familiar ethno-national terms. By contrast, to say
that there is no European demos is equivalent to saying that there is no European
nation. We should immediately add that we agree: There is no European nation or
Volk in the sense that these words are understood by the German Court and the
constitutionalists on which it relies.
But that is not the point. The real point is the following: Is it mandated that demos in
general and the European demos in particular be understood exclusively in the
ethno-cultural homogeneous terms which the German Federal Constitutional Court
has adopted in its own self-understanding? Can there not be other understandings of
demos which might lead to different conceptualizations and potentialities for
Europe?
We have, so far, in this English language narrative studiously avoided using the
concept of citizen and citizenship. Can we not define membership of a polity in
civic, non-ethno-cultural  terms? Can we not separate ethnos from demos? And can
we not imagine a polity whose demos is defined, understood and accepted in civic,
non-ethno-cultural terms, and would have legitimate rule-making democratic
authority on that basis? To be sure, there is a German constitutional tradition from
which the No Demos thesis arises which masks these possibilities since historically,
at least from the time of the Kaiserreich or so there has been such a strong current
which insists on the unity of Volk-Nation-State-Citizenship. A German citizen is,
save for some exceptions, a German national, primarily one who belongs to the
Volk. Belonging to the Volk is normally the condition for citizenship. And, in turn,
citizenship in this tradition can only be understood in statal terms. Here the very
language reflects the conflation: The concept of State is built into the very term of
Staatsangehöriger. If there is citizenship, Statehood is premised. If there is
Statehood, citizenship is premised. This is not simply a matter of constitutional and
political theory. It finds its reflection in positive law. That is why naturalization in
Germany -- other than through marriage, adoption and some other exceptions -- is
an act which implies not simply accepting civic obligations of citizenship and loyalty
to the State but of embracing German national identity understood in this thick
cultural sense, a true cultural assimilation and a demand for an obliteration of other
Volkish loyalties and identification. Thus, for example, emancipation of the Jews in
Germany was premised on a consignment of Jewishness and Judaism to the realm of
religion and a refusal to accept Jewish peoplehood. To be a German citizen, under
this conception, you have to be part of the Volk. And Germany as a State, is the
State of the Germans understood in these terms.
Likewise, until very recently, you may have been a third generation resident of
Germany and be denied citizenship because you are unable or unwilling to become
"German" in a cultural and identification sense.  With few exceptions, the law
specifically denies naturalization to resident who would wish to embrace the duties
of citizenship but retain an alternative national identity. Multiple citizenship is
permitted in peculiar circumstances but is frowned upon. By contrast, if you are an
ethnically defined German national even if a third generation citizen and resident of
some far flung country you would still be a member of the Volk and hence have a
privileged position in applying for citizenship. On this view, the legal "passport" of
membership in the polity is citizenship: Citizenship is what defines you as a member
of the polity with full political and civil rights and duties. But that, in turn, is
conflated with nationality, with being a member of the Volk in the ethno-cultural
sense. And, since Demos is defined in national terms, the only Demos conceivable
is one the members of which are citizen-nationals -- hence the state.
We should point out again that Germany is not the only state in Europe or elsewhere
whose membership philosophy is so conceived. In some measure that is the
philosophy of the nation-state. But it does offer a rather extreme example of the
conflation of State, Volk/Nation and Citizenship.
Be that as it may, this conflation is neither necessary conceptually, nor practiced
universally, nor, perhaps, even desirable. There are quite a few states where, for
example, mere birth in the state creates actual citizenship or an entitlement to
citizenship without any pretence that you thus become a national in an ethno-cultural
sense. There are states where citizenship, as a commitment to the constitutional
values and the civic duties of the polity are the condition of naturalization whereas
nationality, in an ethno-cultural sense is regarded, like religion, a matter of
individual preference. There are states, like Germany, with a strong ethno-cultural
identity, which, nonetheless, allow citizenship not only to individuals with other
nationalities, who do not belong to the majority Volk, but to minorities with strong,
even competing, ethno-cultural identities. It is, we suppose, a matter for the
Germans to decide whether the unity of Volk, Staat, and Staatsangehörigkeit
continues to be the best way in which to conceive of their state, nation and citizenry.
Embedded, however, in the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is an
understanding not only of German polity and demos but of Europe too, notably in its
"Not Yet" formulation. When the German Court tells us that there is not yet a
European demos, it implicitly invites us to think of Europe, its future and its very
telos in ethno-national terms. It implicitly construes Europe in some sort of "pre-
state" stage, as yet underdeveloped and hence lacking in its own legitimate rule-
making and democratic authority. It is this (mis)understanding which produces the
either-or zero sum relationship between Europe and Member State. If demos is Volk
and citizenship can only be conceived as Staatsangehörigkeit, then European demos
and citizenship can only come at the expense of the parallel German terms.
What is inconceivable in this view is a decoupling of nationality (understood its
Volkish ethno-cultural sense) and citizenship. Also inconceivable is a demos
understood in non-organic civic terms, a coming together on the basis not of shared
ethnos and/or organic culture, but a coming together on the basis of shared values, a
shared understanding of rights and societal duties and shared rational, intellectual
culture which transcend ethno-national differences. Equally inconceivable in this
view is the notion of a polity enjoying rule making and democratic authority whose
demos, and hence the polity itself, is not statal in character and is understood
differently from the German self-understanding. Finally, and critically, what is also
inconceivable on this view is that a Member State like Germany may have its own
understanding of demos for itself (for example its relatively extreme form of
State=People=Citizens) but be part of a broader polity with a different
understanding of demos.
At the root of the No Demos thesis is ultimately a world view which is enslaved to
the concepts of Volk, Staat and Staatsangehöriger and cannot perceive the
Community or Union in anything other than those terms. This is another reason why
the Union may appear so threatening since the statal vision can only construe it in
oppositional terms to the Member State. But that is to impose on the Community or
Union an external vision and not an attempt to understand (or define it) in its own
unique terms.
Between State Citizenship and Union Membership
How is it possible, it may be asked by those to whom Volk is the demos, and this
demos is the basis for legitimate authority in a statal structure,  other than in a
formalistic and semantic sense to decouple peoplehood from citizenship? Do not
Volk and nationality with their ethno-cultural grounding create in the individual
member a sense of closeness, in the national community a sense of social cohesion,
which are both necessary for the sense of duty and loyalty which are and should be
conditions for citizenship?
There may be strength in this argument. The critique of it is not that it is necessarily
wrong, but that it is a world view which may be seen as more or less attractive. It is
certainly far from compelling. We wish to look at it first at the level of state and
then at the European level.
Here are some reasons to be suspicious of this view even at the statal level:
Note first the impoverished view of the individual and human dignity involved in the
Volk-State-Citizenship equation: Is it really not possible for an individual to have
very strong and deep cultural, religious and ethnic affiliations which differ from the
dominant ethno-cultural group in a country, and yet in truth accept full rights and
duties of citizenship and acquit oneself honorably? And to look at the other,
societal, side of this coin: Is it necessary for the state to make such a  deep claim on
the soul of the individual, reminiscent of the days when Christianity was a condition
for full membership of civic society and full citizenship rights -- including the right
to have citizenship duties?
Note, too, that the view that would decouple Volk from Demos and Demos from
State, in whole or in part, does not require a denigration of the virtues of nationality
-- the belongingness, the social cohesion the cultural and human richness which may
be found in exploring and developing the national ethos. It simply questions whether
nationality, in this ethno-cultural sense must be the exclusive  condition of full
political and civic membership of the polity. Let us not mince our words: To reject
this construct as impossible and/or undesirable is to adopt a worldview which
informs ethnic cleansing though we am not suggesting of course that the German
Court and its Judges feel anything but abhorrence to that particular solution.
Be all this as it may at the level of state and nation, the conflating of Volk with
demos and demos with state, is clearly unnecessary as a model for Europe. In fact
such a model would deflect Europe from its supranational civilizing telos and ethos.
 There is no reason for the European demos to be defined in terms identical to the
demos of its Member States or vice-versa.
Consider the Maastricht citizenship provisions:
Article 8
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established.
Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of
the Union [...]
The introduction of citizenship to the conceptual world of the Union could be seen
as just another step in the drive towards a statal, unity vision of Europe,  especially
if citizenship is understood as being premised on statehood. 
But there is another more tantalizing and radical way of understanding the provision,
namely as the very  conceptual decoupling of nationality/Volk from citizenship and
as the conception of a polity the demos of which, its membership, is understood in
civic rather than ethno-cultural terms. On this view, the Union belongs to, is
composed of, citizens who by definition do not share the same nationality. The
substance of membership (and thus of the demos) is in a commitment to the shared
values of the Union as expressed in its constituent documents, a commitment to the
duties and rights of a civic society covering discrete areas of public life, a
commitment to membership in a polity which privileges exactly the opposites of
classic ethno-nationalism -- those human features which transcend the differences of
organic ethno-culturalism. What is special in this concept is that it invites
individuals to see themselves as belonging simultaneously to two demoi, albeit
based on different subjective factors of identification. I am a German national in the
inreaching  strong sense of ethno-cultural identification and sense of belongingness.
I am  simultaneously a European citizen in terms of my European transnational
affinities to shared values which transcend the ethno-national diversity. So much so,
that in the a range of areas of public life,  I am  willing to accept the legitimacy and
authority of decisions adopted by my fellow European citizens in the realization that
in these areas we have given preference to choices made by my outreaching demos,
rather than by my inreaching demos.
The Treaties on this reading would have to be seen not only as an agreement among
states (a Union of States) but as a "social contract" among the nationals of those
states --  ratified in accordance with the constitutional requirements in all Member
States --  that they will in the areas covered by the Treaty regard themselves as
associating as citizens in this civic society. This would be fully consistent with, say,
Habermass' notion of Constitutional Patriotism. But we can go even further. In this
polity, and to this demos, one cardinal value is precisely that there will not be a
drive towards, or an acceptance of, an overarching ethno-cultural national identity
displacing those of the Member States. Nationals of the Member States are
European Citizens, not the other way around. Europe is "not yet" a demos in the
ethno-cultural sense and should never become one.
One should not get carried away with this construct. Note first that the Maastricht
formula does not imply a full decoupling: Member States are free to define their
own conditions of membership and these may continue to be defined in Volkish
terms.  (But then we know that the conditions of nationality and citizenship differ
quite markedly from one Member State to another.) Moreover, the gateway to
European citizenship passes through Member State nationality. More critically, even
this construct of the European demos, like the Volkish construct, depends on a shift
of consciousness. Individuals must think of themselves in this way before such a
demos could have full legitimate democratic authority. The key for a shift in political
boundaries is the sense of feeling that the boundaries surround one's own polity. We
are  not making the claim that this shift has already occurred. Nor are we making
any claims about the translation of this vision into institutional and constitutional
arrangements. We are making, however, the following claims: A. We don't know
about public consciousness of a civic polity based demos  because the question has
to be framed in this way in order to get a meaningful response. B. This shift will not
happen if one insists that the only way to understand demos is in Volkish ways. C.
That this understanding of demos makes the need for democratization of Europe
even more pressing. A demos which coheres around values must live those values. 
There is one final issue which touches, perhaps, the deepest stratum of the No
Demos thesis. It is one thing to say, as does Maastricht, that nationals of Member
States are citizens of the Union. But are not those nationals also citizens of their
Member State? Even if one accepts that one can decouple citizenship and nationality
and that one can imagine a demos based on citizenship rather than on nationality,
can one be a citizen of both polities? Can one be a member of not one but also a
second demos? We have already noted the great aversion of this strand of German
constitutionalism to multiple citizenship.
We  want to address this question in two different ways. One is simply to point out
the fairly widespread practice of states allowing double or even multiple citizenship
with relative equanimity. For the most part, as a matter of civic duties and rights this
does not create many problems. This is so also in the Community. It is true that in
time of, say, war the holder of multiple citizenship may be in an untenable situation.
But cannot even the European Union create a construct which assumes that war
among its constituent Member States is not only materially impossible but
unthinkable? The sentiment against multiple citizenship is not, we think, rooted in
practical considerations.
Instead, at a deeper level the issue of double citizenship evokes the spectre of
double loyalty. The view which denies the status of demos to Europe may derive
thus from a resistance to the idea of double loyalty.  The resistance to double loyalty
could be rooted in the fear that some flattened non-descript unauthentic and artificial
"Euro-culture" would come to replace the deep, well articulated, authentic and
genuine national version of the same. It could also be rooted in the belief that double
loyalty must mean that either one or both loyalties have to be compromised.
On the first point  we do not believe that any of the European ethno-cultural
identities is so weak or fragile as to be risked by the spectre of a simultaneous civic
loyalty to Europe. We have already argued that the opposite is also likely. Unable to
rest on the formal structures of the State, national culture and identity has to find
truly authentic expressions to enlist loyalty which can bring about real internally
found generation. What is more, the existential condition of fractured self, of living
in two or more worlds can result not in a flattening of one's cultural achievement but
in its sharpening and deepening. Can anyone who has read Heine, or Kafka, or
Canetti doubt this? ( It might in fact be threatened far more by the simple economic
Europe of the Single Market and the like. One cannot overestimate the profound
impact of the market on low and high culture.)
But what about the political aversion to double loyalty? This, paradoxically, is most
problematic especially in a polity which cherishes ethno-cultural homogeneity as a
condition of membership.  It is hard to see why,  other than for some mystical or
truly "blood thicker than water" rationale, say, a British citizen who thinks of herself
as British (and who forever will speak with an English accent)  but who is settled in,
say, Germany and wishes to assume all the duties and rights of German citizenship
could not be trusted in today's Europe loyally to do so? Moreover, we have already
seen that European citizenship would have a very different meaning than German
citizenship. The two identities would  not be competing directly "on the same turf." 
It seems to us  that  the aversion to double loyalty, like the aversion to multiple
citizenship itself, does not seem to be rooted primarily in practical considerations. It
rests we think in a normative view which wants national self-identity to rest very
deep in the soul, in a place which hitherto was occupied by religion. The imagery of
this position is occasionally evocative of those sentiments. Religion, with greater
legitimacy, occupies itself with these deeper recesses of the human spirit and,
consequently makes these claims for exclusivity. The mixing of State loyalty and
religion risks, in our view, idolatry from a religious perspective and can be highly
dangerous from a political one.  Historically, it seems as if Volk and Staat did
indeed come to occupy these deepest parts of the human spirit to the point of being
accepted  "über alles" with terrifying consequences. our view of the matter is not
that the very idea of Volk and Staat was murderous nor even evil though, as we
think is clear from this essay, our  preference is for multiple loyalties, even demoi
within the polity. It is the primordial position which Volk and Staat occupied,
instilling uncritical citizenship which allowed evil, even murderous designs to be
executed by dulling critical faculties, legitimating  extreme positions, subduing
transcendent human values and debasing one of the common strands of the three
monotheistic religions that human beings, all of them, were created in the image of
God.
How then do we achieve "critical citizenship"? The European construct we have put
forward, which allows for a European civic, value-driven demos co-existing side by
side with a national ethno-cultural one (for those nation-states which want it), could
be seen as a rather moderate contribution to this noble goal. Maybe in the realm of
the political, the special virtue of contemporaneous  membership in a national ethno-
cultural demos and in a supranational civic, value-driven demos is  in the effect
which such double membership may have on  taming the great appeal, even craving,
for belonging in this world which nationalism continues to offer but which can so
easily degenerate to intolerance and xenophobia. Maybe  the national in-reaching
ethno-cultural demos and the out-reaching supranational civic demos by
continuously keeping each other in check  offer a structured model of critical
citizenship. Maybe we should celebrate, rather than reject with aversion, the
politically fractured self and double identity which dual membership involves  which
can be seen as conditioning us not to consider any polity claiming our loyalty to be 
"über alles." Maybe this understanding of Europe makes it appear so alluring to
some, so threatening to others. In any event, if there is to be a European demos, it
should, we argue, be constructed in this, rather the ethno-cultural mode.
III. European Democracy -- International, Supranaitonal, Infranational
A description and analysis of European governance will depend today in large
measure on the literature you chose to study. Three approaches have become
prominent -- for convenience we have called them, international (intergovernmental)
supranational  and infranational. There is an inevitable correlation between the
disciplinary background of the literatures and their respective focus on governance.
The international approach,  typified by the work of, say,  Andrew Moravscik, has
its intellectual roots and sensibilities in international relations. The supranational
approach, typified by the work of say, Weiler and others, has its roots and
sensibilities in public law and comparative constitutionalism. The infranational
approach, typified by the work of Giandomenico Majone and his Florence
associates, stems from a background in domestic policy studies and the regulatory
state. This is not, however, a case of disciplinary entrenchment. All approaches are
mindful of the need to weave together the political, and social, the legal and
economic. Nor is it yet another simplistic instance of the proverbial Blind Men and
the Elephant. The three approaches are aware of the others but choose to "privilege"
what, given the disciplinary background, seems most important to explain and
understand in Union governance. More importantly the approaches, in our view,
reflect a reality.  In some crucial spheres Union governance is international; in other
spheres it is supranational; in yet others it is infranational. How the Single European
Act was negotiated is not simply an example of the IR approach; it is an example of
the Community at a high international or intergovernmental moment. Instances of
Supranational decisionmaking would be, say, the adoption of the big framework
harmonization directives such as Banking or Video Rental Rights or, at a lover
level, the Tobacco  Labeling Directive and, no less interestingly, the rejection of the
Tobacco Advertising Directive. The Infranational approach is characterized by the
relative unimportance  of the national element in the decision making. Technical
expertise, economic and social interests, administrative turf battles shape the
process and outcome rather than "national interest." Infranational decision making is
typified by the miasma of, say, health and safety standard setting,
telecommunications harmonization policy, international trade rules-of-origin.
It is not, then, that the observational standpoint and the sensibility of the observer
defines the phenomenon. On our reading certain objective aspects of the
phenomenon attract the attention of different observers. There are three approaches
but also three modes of governance. Likewise, it would be facile, based on the
above examples, to conclude, simpliciter, that intergovernmental deals with
"important" issues, supranational with "middle range" issues and infranational with
trivia. The commonsensical wisdom of Parkinson may well apply in this area too:
Huge diplomatic effort may be invested in this or that provision of, say, the SEA;
enormous resources may be invested in sheparding an harmonization measure
through the ever more complex Commission-Council-Parliament procedures; and
yet the reality of important aspects of the Single Market may have a lot more to do
with the details of implementation, with the actual standards set by committees and
the like. Here, too, we will resort to a mere capsule version of the three modes.
For the International approach States are the key players and Governments the
principal actors. As a mode of governance, the Union, on this perspective is seen as
an inter-national arena or regime in which governments (primarily the executive
branch) are the privileged  power holders. The Union is principally a context, a
framework within which states/governments interact. In the Supranational approach
States are privileged players but the Community/Union is not only or primarily  a
framework but  a  principal player as well. The privileged  actors are State
governments and Community Institutions. State governments here is understood to
include the main branches -- legislative and judicial though, not necessarily with
equal weight. But here, too, the executive branch is the key State player. The
Commission, Council and increasingly the European Parliament, are critical actors
and fora of decision making. The Infranational approach downplays both the
Community and the Member States as principal players and likewise the role of
primary state and community institutions. In that it is distinct from the international
and supranational. It is like the international approach in that  Union is primarily a
context, a framework within which actors interact. The actors however tend to be,
both at Union and Member State levels administrations, departments, private  and
public associations, certain, mainly corporate, interest groups.
In the international mode the focus is on negotiation, intergovernmental bargaining
and diplomacy. There is a relatively low level of institutionalization, and a premium
on informal and unstructured interaction.  Formal sovereign equality (including a
formal veto) and the loose reflexes of international law prevail which, of course,
should not be understood as leading to full equalization of power among the actors.
The materia is often -- though clearly not always -- constitutional (in non-technical
sense). The modus-operandi of the supranational mode is  more structured, formal
and rule bound. Bargaining and negotiation are far more akin to a domestic
legislative process of coalition building, vote counting and rule manipulation. The
materia is, frequently, primary legislation. Infranationalism is mostly about
regulatory governance and management. There is a medium to low level of
institutionalization and informal networking between "government" and corporate
players abound.  The international mode is characterized typically by high actor
visibility and medium to low process visibility. Supranationalism is characterized by
medium (aspiring to high!) actor visibility and medium to low process visibility.
Infranationalism has both low actor and process visibility.
Internationalism, Supranationalism and Infranationalism -- Static (structural)  Elements
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Internationalism, Supranationalism and Infranationalism -- Dynamic Elements
The inter-supra-infra trichotomy enables us to build a better picture of the
disbursement of power and accountability in the Union. Critical in building this
picture is to understand not only the different modes of empowerment of, and desert
to, various actors according to the mode of governance but also the fluidity and
hence dynamics of allocation of issues to the different forms of decision making.
The stakes as to arena,  where (in this scheme) issues get decided, is as important as
what  gets decided -- since the where impacts, indeed determines the what.  For the
lawyers among readers, the ERTA decision or Opinion 1/76 was not about content
but about forum and mode of decision making: A bid by the Commission to transfer
the treaty negotiation from the international to supranational arena. The Maastricht
three pillar structure is also about arena,  and the various positions of the European
Parliament in the ongoing Community debate should be partly understood as bids
about mode rather than content of policy making.  Since the SEA which saw the
strengthening of both the legal framework of supranational decision making and the
relative empowerment of the Commission and Parliament, we have seen
considerable political battles concerning fora rather than outcome. Comitology
becomes a live issue in exactly the same period.
The static model already suggested "inbuilt" empowerment of certain actors: State
Government in the international mode, State Government and Community
Institutions in the Supranational mode, Administrations (national and Community)
and certain corporate actors in the infranational mode. But this, surely, is only a
starting point. Examine the three modes from the perspective of non-governmental
public and private actors. Actors which have privileged access to national
government (eg government political parties) could have an interest in international
decision making. An opposition party may, by contrast, presage for supranational
decision making, if the Community balance of power favours its position. A
coalition of Member States may pressage transfer (or maintenance) of an issue in the
Surpanational arena where majorities have more weight and are more legitimate. A
minority or individual Member State may pressage for transfer to the international
arena (eg. France over the Blair House Agreement) where definitionally the specific
gravity of each Member State is higher.
Control and accountability are also critical variables in understanding the
implication of the three modes. The international mode will favour domestic arenas
of accountability (national parliaments, national press). The supranational mode
suffers from all the defects which the Standard Version tends to highlight.
Infranationalism has an all-round low level of accountability.  By contrast, Judicial
Review tends to be more substantive in the supranational arena, procedural in the
infranational arena and scant in the international arena. When judicial review is
perceived as a threat we may expect to find arena battles.
This capsule only hints at a research agenda; but it is suggestive of the need for a
differentiated approach in understanding the democratic problems of European
integration.
IV. Models of Democracy
 Whatever insight the study of the three arenas may eventually yield regarding the
disbursement and accountability of power, it will not, in and of itself, point to
"democratic" defficiencies or solutions. One key problem is that democratic theory,
and democratic sensibilities, have developed almost exclusively in statal contexts. 
One enterprize would be to fashion a tailor made democratic theory for the
Community. In this project we are far less ambitious. We wish to use off-the-peg
democratic wares. But the discussion of demos and of governance illustrate the care
with which we must handle the transferability of statal concepts to the European
context.  What is needed, perhaps,  are different garments for the different arenas
and modes of Union governance.
We shall only take a first step in this essay: Exploring  possible "fits" between
varous democratic models and Union modes of governance with a view to a better
understanding of the problems of democratic governance in the Union.
 International (Intergovernmental) Governance and the Consociational Model
Consociational theory emerged to fill a gap in traditional democratic theory. One of
the principle tasks of democratic theory was to explain the functionality and stability
of pluralistic democratic political systems, given that by definition of pluralist
democracy, such systems would be divided by competing political forces. The
classical explanation given by democratic theory to this basic paradox of functional
stability in a competitive pluralistic society was by reference to the notion of cut-
crossing cleavages. Cut-crossing cleavages, for reasons which do not interest us
here, have the effect of leading both to stability and functionality.
By contrast when social cleavages reinforce each other (catholic-protestant; poor-
rich; urban-agrarian etc.) when the social policy is deeply fragmented, society
becomes conflict-laden which leads (while democracy is preserved) in turn to
immobilism in policy-making and erosion of stability.
And yet, historically, several smaller countries in Europe - Holland, Austria,
Switzerland, and Belgium up to a point - were socially "cleavaged" in just that way
and yet managed to display in certain periods the functionality and stability of the
centripetal explanation until the 60s. (Daalder, a Dutchman, and one of the Fathers
of Consociational theory, recalls how he was told by a leading political scientist:
"You know, your country theoretically cannot exist".) Consociational theory tries to
explain the functionality and stability of these countries. Its basic explanatory device
has been the behavior of political elites which control/lead the fragmented social
segments.
Crucial to Consociational theory is the existence of sharply segmented societal
sectors. Consociational theory is not interested in the reasons for segmentation (the
content of the cleavages), but in their empirical existence. At this level then the
model seems to correspond to International dimension of Union governance: A
transnational polity sharply segmented by its Member States and indeed displaying
the expected characteristics of immobilism - and yet somehow creating structures
which manage to transcend these immobilistic tendencies.
Of course, the very creation of structures and institutions for the international
mode, like the two non-Community Maastricht Pillars, like the European Council,
may be said to indicate a higher level of commonality than consociationalism is
designed to respond to. We think the commonality is in the desire to have a common
policy but substantive policy fragmentation is acute in relation to several of the
contexts in which the International mode operates. Indeed, the very lack of
substantive commonality is what pushed the Member States to insist on this form of
governance in this area.
The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any
particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to
render the system functional and stable. The key element is what Dahrendorf has
termed a cartel of elites.
Consociational theorists seek to show how in all successful consociational
democracies, normal traditional political fora were bypassed, and substituted by fora
in which the leaders of all social segments participated, and compacts were arrived
at, disregarding the principle of majority rule and using instead consensual politics.
Competitive features are removed and cooperation sought. Worth noting is that the
alternative fora might in themselves become institutionalized and rather formal.
Typically Consociationalism works on the basis of consensus, package deals and
other features characteristic of elite bargaining. The elites, representing their
respective segments, realize that the game is not zero-sum nor is it a winner take all.
The two basic requirements for success according to Consociational theory would
be that elites share a commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the
improvement of its cohesion, functionality and stability; and that elites understand
the perils of political fragmentation. Elites must also be able to "deliver" their
constituents (and compliance) to deals thus struck.
This of course begs some questions. In traditional Consociational theory this
commitment will come out of the loyalty of elites to their country and society. Our
claim is that the formal extension in Maastricht of Union governance to areas
hitherto dealt with informally or, at best, within European Political Cooperation,
demonstrates a degree of commitment to the European polity which, however is not
matched by sufficient degree of trust in supranational governance. Hence
consociationalism as a model.
But Consociational theorists suggest it is possible in addition to identify several
further features which will be conducive to the success of Consociationalism. These
include the length of time a consociational democracy has been in operation; the
existence of external threats to the polity; the existence of a multiple balance of
power; a relatively low total load on the decision-making apparatus. We think all
these features are characteristic of the Union international mode of governance too.
So far we have concentrated on the behavior of the elites themselves.
Consociational theory stipulates two further conditions for successful
functioning:The elites must be able to carry their own segments along. And there
should be widespread approval of the principle of government by elite cartel.
In looking at past practice there do seem to be several points of contact between the
Consociational model and the international practice of the Union: The existence of a
structure composed of highly sharp segments (the Member States) which display a
tendency to immobilism (which classical theory would predict) but which manages
nonetheless to score a measure of functionality and stability (which Consociational
theory tries to explain). The key factor of Consociationalism elite behavior, (in our
case governments) also seems confirmed in the international mode.
The pay-off of consociationalism seems to be the achievement of stability in the face
of high degree of social fragmentation which normal pluralist models cannot
achieve. There are, naturally, implications for self-understanding of democracy in
the polity. The democratic justification of consociationalism begins from the
acceptance of deep and permanent fragmentation in the polity. Even in traditional
constitutional pluralist democracies there is an acceptance that certain "high stake"
decisions, such as constitutional amendments, require "super majorities" or other
mechanisms which would be more inclusive of minorities. Consociationalism rejects
the democratic legitimacy of permanent minorityship which is possible, even likely,
for a fragmented polity operating a pluralist, majoritarian election and voting
system. Consociationalism seems, thus,  to enhance legitimacy in its inclusiveness
and the broadening of ultimate consent to government. Theoretically, there is a
strong case to be made for a consociational type of inclusiveness also in relation to
at least certain areas of Union governance. If the international mode is, in fact,
consociational, this would be a justification not from an efficiency and stability
perspective but from a normative representational one as well.
The democratic problems of consociationalism and hence of the Union when
operating in the International mode are no less grave. First, the democratic gaze
must shift to the constituent units of the consociational model -- in this case to the
Member States. It will often be discovered that some elites, within the
consociational cartel of elites, have very deficient internal democratic structures of
control and accountability. Even a facile comparison among the structures which
exist within the various Member States to control their governments is sufficient to
illustrate this point. Even more troubling: Consociationalism might actually act as a
retardant to internal democratization because the"external" context both empowers
the representing elite (executive branch of government) and may even create a
mobilizing ethos of, say, the "national interest" which justifies sacrificing calls for
transparency and accountability. These calls can be, and usually are, presented as
"weakening" the ability of the elite to represent effectively in the external context.
Second, consociational power-sharing is favorable to "status" social forces, those
whose elites participate in the cartel. It excludes social forces which are not so
recognized. "New" minorities are typically disfavoured by consociational regimes.
The corollary of this in the Union would be "new" minorities within the Member
States whose voices are not vindicated by the Government and are those doubly
disfavoured both at national and Union levels. Consociationalism can be seen as
weakening true representative and responsive government.
Finally, consociational politics typically favour the social status quo and, whilst
mediating the problems of deeply fragmented societies also are instrumental in
maintaining those very fragments. This can be highly problematic for some
conceptions of European integration. Given that the consociational fragments in this
context are the Member States themselves,  the International mode understood in
consociational terms is not only about ensuring the inclusion of all Member State
voices in certain critical areas but in actually sustaining the Member State and their
governments as such and, for example, retarding the formation of transnational
coalitions of interests who, in the areas of the international mode, would and could
have no impact in a process which privileged States and their governments.
B. Supranationalism, Pluralism and Competitive Elitism
The Supranational mode of governance is the closest to a State model and thus,
paradoxically perhaps, we will say little about it. It can be analyzed most profitably
in our views either with insights from Weberian or Schumpeterian competitive elites
model of democracy or, aspirationally at least, to a statal, federal version of pluralist
democracy. The Standard Version we presented above captures most of its actual or
even would be shortcomings and we do not plan to recapitulate these here.
C. Infranationalism and the Neo-Corporatist Model of Governance and
Democracy
It is not our claim that Infranationalism is the Union variety of neo-corporatism.  But
it does share some common features and hence the conjunction of both may help us
identify some of the democratic problems with infranationalism.
Classical neo-corporatism identified a privileging of government, industry and
labour in an attempt to avoid a confrontational mode of governance and reach a
politics of accommodation which would resolve economic problems in both periods
of expansion and stagnation. The focus was on macroeconomic policy as defining
the central public choices confronting the polity. Neo-corporatism was, in our mind,
 a technocratic view which believed in management, distrusted to some extent
markets, and favoured stability and predictability. It is not surprising that its political
instincts also favoured governance through negotiation with highly organized
interests having representational monopoly.  In some respect neo-corporatism is a
technocratic version of consociationalism. Neo-corporatism does not replace
parliament and other institutions and processes of pluralist democratic government,
but simply side-steps them in reaching the fundamental public choices of the polity. 
Inevitably there is an erosion in the substantive power and status of parliamentary
bodies parties and the like.  Corporatism of the pre-World War II was aimed at
undermining those aspects of pluralist democracy in the name of efficiency and
stability. Its post War neo-corporatist version did not have that objective but had
some similar institutional frameworks.
The Infranational arena is no neo-corporatist model. Its reach extends well beyond
macro-economic policy and the concerns of managing the business cycles which
dominated politics of the 60s and 70s. It is decidedly not a tripartite relationship
between government, business and labour. But it has some evocatively similar
features:
1. The underlying ethos of Infranationalism is managerial and technocratic;
the belief that a rational management and regulatory solutions can be found
by an employment of technocratic expertise.
2.  There is an underlying premise which puts a premium on stability and
growth and is suspicious of strongly re-distributive policies and, more
generally, on ideology and "politics".
3.  Infranationalism has a strong push toward representational monopolies and
the creation of structures which will channel organized functional interests
into the policy making and management procedures (CEN, CENLEC and the
like).
4. Infranationalism, because of its managerial, functional and technocratic
bias operates outside parliamentary channels, outside party politics. There is
nothing sinister or conspiratorial in infranationalism, but its processes
typically lack transparency and may have low procedural and legal
guarantees. Its seeks its legitimation in results rather than process.
As we would expect, in some respects Infranationalism overcomes some of the
problems of the international mode. It is both an expression of, and instrumental in,
the decline of the State and its main organs as the principal vehicle for vindicating
interest in the European polity.  Infranationalism is about  transnational interest
groups, governance without (State) government, empowerment beyond national
boundaries and the like. But it suffers too from many of the problems of neo-
corporatism and some problems of its own. We would mention in particular the
following:
a. The technocratic and managerial solutions often mask ideological choices
which are not debated and subject to public scrutiny beyond the immediate
interests related to the regulatory or management area.
b. Participation in the process is limited to those privileged by the process;
fragmented and diffuse interests, other public voices are often excluded.
c. As in the consociational model, the process itself might distort power
relationships and democracy within the groups represented in the process.
d. The process itself not only lacks transparency but also is typically of low
procedural formalities thus not ensuring real equality of voice of those who
actually do take part in the process. Judicial review is scant and tends to insist
on basic rights to be heard rather than fairness of outcome.
e. In general, the classical instruments of control and public accountability are
ill-suited to the practices of infranationalism. They are little affected by
elections, change in government and the new instruments introduced by, say,
Maastricht.
V. Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries
Let  us start with yet another truism. Although the principle of universal suffrage and
majoritarianism informs all modern systems of democratic governance, it is not an
absolute principle. Modern democracies, taking their cue principally from the
American rather than British democratic tradition, increasingly acknowledge a
higher law -- typically a constitution -- which binds even the legislature. In an
increasing number of modern democracies the higher law is backed up by courts and
a system of judicial review which give it, so to speak, teeth. Within this
constitutional ethos judicial protection of fundamental human rights has a central
place. Constitutionalism, despite its counter-majoritarian effect are regarded as a
complimentary principle to majoritarianism rather than its negation. One formulation
which describes the complex relationship between the two is the notion of
protection against a tyranny of the majority -- seemingly an oxymoron. We will not 
enter into the complex theoretical discussion of rights and their relationship to
democracy. The appeal of rights, whatever the theoretical justification has to do
with two roots. The first of these two roots regards fundamental rights as an
expression of a vision of humanity which vests the deepest values in the individual
which, hence, may not be compromised by anyone. Probably one of the oldest and
most influential sources of this vision is to be found in the Pentateuch: And God
created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him. (Gen.I:27).
With this trademark, what legislator has the authority to transgress the essential
humanity of the species? Naturally, there are secular, humanist parallels a plenty.
The other root for the great appeal of rights  and part of the justification of their 
countermajoritarian semblance looks to them as an instrument for the per-se value of
putting constraints on power. Modern democracy emerges, after all, also as a
rejection of absolutism and absolutism is not the prerogative of kings and emperors.
Similar sentiments inform the great appeal of fundamental boundaries in non-unitary
systems -- federal states and the European Union. We use the term Fundamental
Boundaries as a way of conceptualizing in a normative sense the principle of
enumerated powers or limited competences of the central authorities in these
systems. The appeal of fundamental boundaries rests in two parallel roots. First as
an expression of a vision of humanity  which vests the deepest values in individual
communities existing within larger polities which, thus, may not be transgressed.
The vision of humanity derives from an acknowledgment of the social nature of
humankind, as a counterbalance to the potential atomism of fundamental rights, --
And the Lord God said: It is not good that  man should be alone --  (Gen II:18) and
from the realization that smaller social units can suffer parallel oppression to
individuals by stronger societal forces. That enumeration is also said to work as a
bulwark against aggregation of power is its second appeal.
We are unaware of any federal system which does not claim to give expression to
these notions. But there are as many variants as there are systems. Comparative
analysis can be particularly alluring here. In Europe there has been a practical
eruption of the hitherto dormant question of Community "competences and powers"
, a question and debate which has found its code in the deliciously vague word, term
and concept of Subsidiarity. This is inevitably connected to the continued pre-
occupation with governance structures and processes, balance between Community
and Member State and the Democracy and legitimacy of the Community.
What accounts for this eruption?
First a bit of history. Here is an analysis from the run-up period to the  Maastricht
IGC.
The student of comparative federalism discovers a constant feature in practically all
federative experiences: a tendency, which differs only in degree, towards
controversial concentration of legislative and executive power in the centre/general
power at the expense of constituent units. This is apparently so independently of the
mechanism for allocation of jurisdiction/competences/powers between centre and
"periphery". Differences, where they occur, are dependent more on the ethos and
political culture of polities rather than on mechanical devices.
The Community has both shared and differed from this general experience:
It has shared it in that the Community, especially in the 70s, has seen a weakening
of any workable and enforceable mechanism for allocation of
jurisdiction/competences/powers between Community and its Member States.
How has this occurred? It has occurred by a combination of two factors.
a. Profligate legislative practices especially in, for example, the usage of
Article 235 .
b. A bifurcated jurisprudence of the Court which on the one hand extensively
interpreted the reach of the  Jurisdiction/competences/powers granted the
Community and on the other hand has taken a self-limiting approach towards
the expansion of Community jurisdiction/competence/powers when exercised
by the political organs.
To make the above statement is not tantamount to criticizing the Community, its
political organs and the Court. This is a question of values. It is a sustainable thesis,
which we share, that this process was overall beneficial, in its historical context, to
the evolution and well being of Community, Member States and its citizens and
residents. But this process was also a ticking constitutional time bomb which, we
wrote,  one day might threaten the evolution and stability of the Community. Sooner
or later,  "Supreme" courts in the Member States would realize that the "Socio-legal
Contract" announced by the Court in its major constitutionalizing decisions, namely
that "the Community constitutes a new legal order... for the benefit of which the
states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields" (emphasis
added) has been shattered, that although they (the "Supreme" courts) have accepted
the principles of the new legal order -- supremacy and direct effect  -- the fields do
not seem any more to be limited, and that in the absence of Community legislative
or legal checks it will fall on them to draw the jurisdictional lines of the Community
and its Member States.
The interesting thing about the Community experience, and this is where it does not
share the experience of other federative polities, is that despite the massive
legislative expansion of Community Jurisdiction/competences/powers there had not
been any political challenge or crisis on this issue from the Member States. (The
challenges and dissatisfaction occurred on some of the occasions when competences
mutated as a result of a Court decision such as in the ERTA case or Rubber
Opinion).
How so?
The answer is simple and obvious and resides in the pre-Single European Act 
decision making process. Unlike federal states, the governments of the Member
States themselves (jointly and severally) could control absolutely the legislative
expansion of jurisdiction/competences/powers. Nothing that was done could be
done without the assent of all national capitals. This fact diffused any sense of threat
and crisis on the part of governments.
This era has now passed with the shift to majority voting  and the seeds -- indeed
the buds --  of crisis are, we wrote, with us. Not only is there an imminent danger
that one of the national courts will take the position predicted (and this might
happen sooner rather than later with the decision now pending before the Federal
Constitutional Court in Germany concerning the Television Without Frontiers
Directive), but the Member States have become aware that in a process that does
not give them a de jure or de facto veto, the question of jurisdictional lines has
become crucial. 
Our own concern, we wrote then, is that if something is not done so that the
European Court of Justice is seen to be the obvious body for resolving this kind of
prospective dispute, some national supreme courts will "rebel" very much as the
Italian and German Constitutional Courts "rebelled" in the 1960s and early 70s on
the issue of protection of fundamental human rights when it was not clear that the
European Court was going to act in this matter in a vigorous manner.
We are well aware that in theory the Court already has jurisdiction to resolve this
kind of issue under Article 173 and 177(b) (lack of competences), but since to date
no Commission or Council measure has been struck down for pure and simple lack
of competences our assessment is that this existing provision in itself will not satisfy
the fears of the Member States.
Somewhat later than  predicted in the above passage,  the German Constitutional
Court did just that. It rejected the ECJs claim to exclusive Kompetenz-Kompetenz
and claimed that the limits to Community legislative powers was as much a matter
of German constitutional law as it was a matter of Community law. As such it, the
German Constitutional regards itself as competent, indeed as mandated by the
German constitution to monitor the jurisdictional limits of the Community legislative
process.
Formally, the decision constitutes a flagrant act of defiance vis-a-vis the European
Court of Justice in direct contradiction with its jurisprudence on the power of
national courts to declare Community law invalid. It flies in the face of, inter alia,
the third paragraph of Article 177  It is also untenable in a legal functionalist sense:
There would be as many fundamental boundaries to the Community as there are
Member States. And how can the same Community measure be considered intra-
vires in one Member State and ultra-vires in another.
But how should one evaluate this development in legal-political terms? We want to
use some of dynamics of the Cold War as a device for evaluating the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz aspect of the Maastricht Decision of the German Constitutional Court.
On this reading, it is not a declaration of War but the commencement of a cold war
with its paradoxical guarantee of co-existence following the infamous MAD logic:
Mutual Assured Destruction. For the German Court actually to declare a
Community norm unconstitutional rather than simply threaten to do so, would be an
extremely hazardous move, so hazardous as to make its usage unlikely. The use of a
tactical nuclear weapons always was considered to carry the risk of creating a
nuclear domino effect. If other Member State courts followed the German lead, or if
other Member States legislatures or governments were to suspend implementation of
the norm on some reciprocity rationale a veritable constitutional crisis in the
Community could become a reality -- the legal equivalent of the Empty Chair
political stand-off in the 60s. It would be hard for the German government to
remedy the situation especially if the German Court decision enjoyed general public
popularity. Could the German Constitutional Court, would the German
Constitutional Court be willing to face the responsibility of dealing such a blow
(rather than a threat of a blow) to European integration?
But the logic of the Cold War is that one has to assume the worst and to arm as if
the other side would contemplate a first strike. The European Court of Justice
would, thus, have to be watching over its shoulder the whole time, trying to
anticipate any potential move by the German Constitutional Court.
It could be argued that this situation is not unhealthy. That the German move of the
90s in relation to competences resembles their prior move in relation to human
rights and that it was only that move which forced the European Court to take
human rights seriously. Thus, the current move will force the Court to take
competences seriously.
This view has some merit in it, but ultimately we find it unpersuasive for two
reasons.
There is no "non proliferation treaty" in the Community structure. MAD
works well, perhaps, in a situation of two superpowers. But there must be a
real fear that other Member State Courts will follow the German lead in
rejecting the exclusive Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the ECJ. The more courts
adopt the weapon, the greater the chances that it will be used. Once that
happens, it will become difficult to push the past back into the tube.
Courts are not the principal Community players. But this square-off will have
negative effects on the decision making process of the Community. The
German Government and Governments whose Courts will follow the German
lead, will surely be tempted to play that card in negotiation. ("We really
cannot compromise on this point, since our Court will strike it down...)
For reasons which space does not allow to elaborate we do not think that a solution
to this problem can be found by a simple drawing up of new list of competences for
the Community.  Instead, we believe that long term solution can only take place by a
change of ethos. Institutions can play a role in this. One possible solution is thus
institutional and we wish to give its bare bones. We would propose the creation of a
Constitutional Council for the Community, modeled in some ways on its French
namesake. The Constitutional Council would have jurisdiction only over issues of
competences (including subsidiarity) and would decide cases submitted to it after a
law was adopted but before coming into force. It could be seized by any Community
institution, any Member State or by the European Parliament acting on a Majority of
its Members. Its President would be the President of the European Court of Justice
and its Members would be sitting members of the constitutional courts or their
equivalents in the Member States. Within the Constitutional Council no single
Member State would have a veto power. The composition would also underscore
that the question of competences is fundamentally also one of national constitutional
norms but still subject to a Union solution by a Union institution. 
We will not elaborate in this essay some of the technical aspects of the proposal. Its
principal merit, if it has any, is that it gives expression to the fundamental boundary
concern without however compromising the constitutional integrity of the
Community as did the German Maastricht decision. Since, from a material point of
view,  the question of boundaries has an inbuilt indeterminacy, the critical issue
becomes not what are the boundaries but who gets to decide. The composition of
the proposed Constitutional Council removes the issue, on the one hand, from the
purely political arena; on the other hand, it creates a body which, on this issue,
would,  we expect, enjoy a far greater measure of public confidence than the ECJ
itself.
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